Friday, 3 February 2012

GAMECHANGER


When Reliance partnered IMG, and when IMG-R acquired the marketing rights owned by the AIFF I felt genuine hope for Indian football. The games governing body here had joined forces with the world’s top sports management company and one of India’s most successful and aggressive corporate giants. What could go wrong?

Now, two years or so down the line, there are rumors of discontent and discord between Reliance and IMG, and of a lack of understanding, leadership and vision. Whether this is fair and accurate or not, as the IFA and CMG launch PLS amid much genuine excitement that reaches far beyond West Bengal, most of India is left wondering what happened to the rest of us. Why has nothing changed?  Everywhere else in India seems to have become immersed in a vacuum of nothingness.

The problem that seems to have floored IMG-R and the AIFF is how to square the circle of established I-League clubs and a franchise structure. You could throw in the issue of no adequate infrastructure and mix it with an already overcrowded calendar and you can easily become submerged with the idea that the whole structure and history of football in India defeats any possibility of meaningful change. ‘What to do?’ would seem an appropriate tag line.

The PLS is a gamechanger. Its long-term future is uncertain as of now, however it’s already changed the landscape of football in India forever. CMG wanted Lionel Messi playing in Kolkata so they brought over Argentina and Venezuela as the cannon fodder. IMG-R and the AIFF responded defensively by making it problematic to host a match in India between two foreign teams. The consequence was that FC Bayern played against an AIFF ‘India XI’. The PLS has brought a similarly defensive response: reluctant tolerance mixed with doubts about the concept and viability, and vague assurances as to their own project, still in the planning. PLS pressures IMG-R and the AIFF to deliver something more meaningful…something in fact.   

The IFA has always been symbolic of the challenges facing would-be Indian football revolutionaries. A powerful self-focused State Association that saw itself and its competitions as more relevant and important than the national league. For many Bengali’s it was more important to win the Kolkata Super League than be champions of India. To some extent Kolkata and the IFA have been pushed towards this thinking by the way that football dominates there in a way that most of the rest of India hasn’t (so far) replicated. Now they’ve done it again by launching their own self-contained Premier League for soccer.

In finding a way forward for India as a whole the challenge for IMG-R and the AIFF is to find a formula that takes the realities as they are, and create a structure that allows corporate investment and addresses the weakness of the infrastructure. There is an appetite for corporate investment in to football, providing the structure and vision is right. There is an enthusiasm among the new generation of football fanatics – and sports fans more generally – for an exciting, glamorous and star-studded football format. All the ingredients are there for IMG-R and the AIFF to create a real gamechanger of their own at a pan-India level. Without this PLS is a ticking bomb.    

Tuesday, 10 January 2012

Reflections on Life and Death

Yesterday someone I knew jumped to his death. He was a friend in so far as we would spend time talking whenever we met, which, living in the same place for some time, was reasonably regular if not frequent. He was only young, successful in his career, seemed happy, a nice guy always ready to help. He never betrayed any need or inner sadness. He was quiet, kept himself to himself, and was supremely fit. His death, and the manner of it, came as a huge shock and he will be missed


Sometimes the challenges of life sweep over us like a tidal wave, at other times the pressures can be relentless. When you live in a high-rise flat escape is ever present, just an open window and a footstep away. In seconds the pain that is drowning you is no more. The tragedy is that most things in life are temporary. Pain – emotional, spiritual, physical – often eases with time, it ebbs away, or we change the way we perceive it so that it no longer becomes the all-consuming darkness in to which we can sink. The challenge will change, will go, the sun will rise, the clouds will clear, but step through the open window and all is lost, forever, there is no chance of coming back 


In a city like Mumbai death seems incidental – it happens all the time, life goes on. I saw an accident, a year or so ago, in which an auto-rickshaw overturned on a busy road in Juhu. Half a dozen men carried a young guy, who was clearly seriously injured, to the side of the road – some took an arm each, others a foot, and as he was lifted I saw his eyes roll upwards. Even as he was dying there were cars trying to edge past, impatient, insulated, not oblivious but anaesthetized from the reality before them. When I returned a couple of hours later it was impossible to see any sign of what had happened earlier. Life carried on, all was back to normal


For those who lose a loved one, patience and understanding are often short-lived. There is still work to attend, the routines of living that need to be followed. Life goes on but when you’ve lost someone you love, who was central to your life, the pain endures and while it may ease with time, it takes time, and a longer time than most people would extend. There’s an expectation of recovery within an unrealistically short space of weeks and months. If the death is tragic or unexpected, and, or, involves a partner or a child, then the time it takes extends perhaps for a lifetime


Mumbai is a high pressure environment. Competition is intense. Working hours are very long. It’s not easy to find space or time for yourself or for those you love or who are important to you. Children are forced in to this climate of relentless competition and expectation from an early age and too often pushed towards careers that are in a different direction to where their true ability and passion lies. It's no wonder that so many young kids kill themselves and then their parents are left with a lifetime of regret

As I go through life I try to be aware of what’s going on around me, not to take people for granted, to be open and conscious of not just what people are saying but what they’re not saying but trying to tell me. I don’t always achieve it but I try to be compassionate and understanding. It’s easy to make assumptions about other people’s lives but the reality is we just don’t know. At the beginning of a new year can I just ask that we all try and judge a little less, understand a little more, and support each other a little better

Wednesday, 7 September 2011

The Dummy Contract


A new form is being used by clubs in India in relation to signing foreign players. At the point the player applies for his visa to go to a club on trial he signs a ‘dummy’ contract with the club and usually a form of cancellation in case the club do not sign him. This enables the player to acquire an employment visa valid throughout the period of his proposed contract with the club and endorsed such that he is only able to play for that club. In this regard it streamlines and simplifies the process and if the player and the club subsequently agree terms and a new contract is signed there are no issues.

If however the player and club don’t agree terms the problems can begin. If the player receives an offer from another club whilst on trial the ‘dummy’ contract – which technically is a legally binding contract - can be used to prevent him from taking up that offer. At one level this is fair enough, in so far as if a club has paid for the players flights and accommodation etc during the trial then it’s fair and reasonable that they should have some protection from another club walking in and taking him. Equally the player has a right to make the final decision as to who he wants to play for.

A reasonable protection might be for the club that brings him over on trial to be fully reimbursed by the club he eventually signs for if the two clubs are different. As things stand the player can be prevented from signing for any other club because he has signed the ‘dummy’ contract – the ‘dummy’ contract, with lower wages etc, can be imposed by the club that brought the player over on trial if that’s what it decides to do. The player is powerless.
Even if the player signs the dummy contract but changes his mind before he flies over he can have a problem. Once the contract is signed, even if the player never sees anyone from the club, and even if the club incurs no costs, they can prevent the player from signing for another club by virtue of the dummy contract. They can demand a transfer fee to release the player even though he has not even had a trial with them and he’s not set foot outside his home country. This can’t be right.

In my experience most players would not understand the full implications of what they’re signing when they put pen to paper on the ‘dummy’ contract. If the player has an agent then the agent should know but if the full purpose and intent behind the contract is not disclosed then there’s a possibility that the justification of ‘easing the visa process’ will be accepted. This is especially true where clubs have earned a reputation for being ‘fair’ in their dealings with players. There are many instances in business more generally where protections in law are in place but without the intention of these ever being used except in extreme circumstances.

One solution would be for the player to pay his own travel costs to come on trial. Where a club pays for the player then the ‘dummy’ contract needs to be placed within a broader framework of related rules and/or understandings. Such rules and understandings should be agreed between the clubs, and with the players union, and should be fair to both sides. While the intention of the ‘dummy’ contract may have been positive its application has been fraught with difficulties which need to be addressed.       

Monday, 29 August 2011

Arsenal Debacle: Who's to Blame?



Three games in to the new season Arsenal float adrift of the title contenders, not just in points and goal difference but in class and expectation. Manchester United destroyed Arsenal with a team without many established stars and with an average age of just 23. Manchester City have evidenced their ambition and their ability. They are potential champions. Chelsea have strengthened and will challenge, as always. The top three are already defined, just the order remains to be seen. The coveted fourth spot, and entry to the lucrative Champions League, already appears to belong to Liverpool – the early indications suggest that their investment has paid off.

For Arsenal the dream has been reduced to ashes. The concept of developing a team of young stars who would mature together has been destroyed by a failure to win trophies and the lure of bigger wages for their key players offered by clubs with bigger ambitions. In 2006 Arsenal were arguably unlucky to lose the UEFA Champions League Final to Barcelona. There was little to choose between the teams. Had Arsenal won...subsequent history might have been different. Had Arsenal become Champions of Europe, had they become established as Europe’s best, would the lure of Barcelona have been quite so strong for Fabregas?

The comparative demise of Arsenal has been long in the making. Firstly the emergence of Chelsea, then the entry of Manchester City – both have redefined the landscape in terms of transfer fees and wages. Arsenal maintained their model of financial prudence, investing in young talent where the wage demands were less whereas their key competitors invested in established stars. Progressively Arsenal slipped behind, clinging to fourth place but unable to bridge the divide between contenders and champions.

The defeat to Birmingham in the Carling Cup Final is seen by many as a watershed, but perhaps that watershed came in the previous season. It was then that the team needed strengthening with genuine world-class talent that would have enabled the team not just to defeat Birmingham but push on and claim two or three titles – they were so near, and yet so far... Fabregas gave up, Nasri was unconvinced, Clichy sought greener pastures. The belief had gone. To strengthen this season was just too late.

Arsene Wenger stands accused as the architect of this demise – too stubborn, arrogant, blinkered, wedded to a flawed concept and unwilling to invest in players of the required experience and quality but is this either fair or accurate? He tried to sign Juan Matta who has made an immediate impact at Chelsea. By all accounts Matta was keen to sign, but Arsenal failed to pay the monies required under his release clause within the timeframe. The fee was apparently not the issue, the player wanted to sign, so what was the problem? Perhaps it was the personal terms?

It’s open knowledge that Arsenal operates a strict wages structure. It’s equally well known that this means Arsenal cannot compete with their primary competitors. So where does this leave Arsene Wenger? There have been rumours that Wenger has called for a revision of the wages ceiling to 150k to enable the club to sign better quality players but that this has been refused by the board. If this is the case can Arsene Wenger fairly be held accountable?

As things stand Arsenal will be among the top choices for any exceptionally talented young player wanting to gain first team experience at a high level. Arsenal will also be high on the list of clubs targeted by predatory competitors who will cherry-pick the best talent once they gain experience and develop to a higher level. Arsenal will be a staging-post not a destination, a training ground rather than a theatre of dreams.

The result at Manchester United was important because it put the situation beyond doubt. There is no question now that Arsenal needs to strengthen, that they need both quality and experience, that they need steel to add to the art. There is no question that to acquire such players Arsenal have to compete with their primary competitors, and to match or better the wages they offer. Once they do this then it will be fairer to assess the ability of a manager who has in the past proved his ability to deliver winning teams.    

Saturday, 6 August 2011

Arsenal: Time to Take Control


I’m a Middlesbrough fan although I’ve worked with Arsenal over the years and I admire the way they do business and the football that they play. The team is exciting and entertaining to watch although their inability in recent years to win trophies is frustrating. So too, at times, is their inability to hold a lead or turn vast superiority in terms of territory and possession in to goals and wins, but hey, football is football and sometimes shit happens.

This summer has heaped more levels of frustration upon frustration. Cesc Fabregas wants to play for Barcelona, Barcelona want to sign him, and even though they would prefer it if he stayed with them Arsenal are prepared to let him go. So what’s the problem? Barcelona don’t have the money to buy him. Simple. As a consequence the world has had to endure an incessant drip-drip from Barcelona (the club) and Barcelona (the city) of players, officials, coaches and politicians pleading with Arsenal to release Fabregas from his torment and allow him to return home to his ‘family’ and the love of his life, Barca...
  
This incessant wailing is accompanied by the undignified spectacle of the Spanish giants mortgaging players by selling them with time-defined agreed-fee buy-back options, and – just to drive the point home – Fabregas even contributing part of his new wages to meet the ransom demand. The point is that it’s not that Fabregas wants to leave Arsenal – any number of Europe’s top clubs would meet their asking price – it’s that he wants to go (only) to Barcelona. Therefore Arsenal have to accept what Barca offer or can afford to pay, after all they are the Champions of Europe, they are big boys, they deserve and get whatever they want, and to the extent that Arsenal may get mugged on the fee it is, after all, a crime of passion.

At the same time we have Samir Nasri wanting to abandon ship and join Gail Clichy at Manchester City’s band of happy campers. It has nothing to do with the ‘half-as-much-again-as-Arsenal-are-offering’ wages but is more about being part of a project that has actually delivered a trophy and promises to deliver more. Clichy has already noted the ‘tough-tackling’ in training which can only be spiced by the brooding resentment of defenders and midfielders who have been offered less than half the money given to new signing Sergio Aguero.

This time next year Nasri, will be out of contract and available without a fee. City are prepared to pay in the region of GBP20m but Arsenal want him to sign a contract extension instead offering in the region of GBP110k a week – substantially less than City are offering. So far Arsenal have insisted they would prefer to keep him, let him run his contract down and then see him go for free if in the end he decides not to stay on with the Gunners.

What we are left with is a drift in deep water. The sense of impending doom is heightened by the club’s failure to address the defensive black hole and the impending Niagra of matches against Udinese, Liverpool and Manchester United that could see Arsenal’s season submerged within weeks of it being launched. Captain Fabregas and first-mate Nasri appear desperate to abandon ship, and the rest of the crew are looking decidedly apprehensive. The time has come for someone to take control.

Nasri is an easy decision. Over the season the transfer fee that Arsenal could get for him equates to around GBP400k a week, add on his wages and you’re up to almost GBP500k a week – think about it for a moment. He has had one-half of a decent season. Sell him. For around the same money bring in Juan Mata arguably a player with greater tenacity, ability and potential. A player who would be cheaper wages wise but more committed, more consistent and a winner. This deal should have been done weeks ago.

Arsenal should state clearly and irrevocably that Barcelona can sign Fabregas if they meet the ‘open-market’ valuation and asking price of GBP40m within a specified period (one month ago should do it). If they don’t he stays. Simple. They should also state that no amount of whining or whinging by bleating mayors or pleading players will weaken that position. If Fabregas doesn’t want to lead the team, and if Barcelona can’t cobble together the cash to deliver Priority Two his place on the bench, then put him on the transfer list. This season there are six contenders for the top four places and as of now Arsenal are looking fifth at best and appear to be drifting to disaster. The time has come to take control of the situation.

From I-League to Premier League: Arsenal & Spurs Fight it Out For Starlet


Nineteen year old Rohit Chand could become the first I-League player to make the transition to the English Premier League with both Arsenal and Tottenham Hotspur said to be monitoring his progress. Chand, a central defender who joined I-League side HAL in 2010, is a regular in the Nepal national team and became the youngest player ever to represent Nepal when he made his debut for the senior side just twenty two days after his seventeenth birthday.

Now firmly established in the national senior team, he has been identified as a special talent by National Team Coach Graham Roberts, the former Spurs, Chelsea and England defender. With French champions Lille also showing interest the omens are good for the youngster and were he to make it to the big time he would serve as an inspiration to all of the young players both in Nepal and in the I-League who have dreams of playing for Europe’s best clubs.

Wednesday, 13 July 2011

Arsenal at the Crossroads of Destiny

Lest we forget, Arsene Wenger knows how to build a Championship winning football team. In 1997-98 he led Arsenal to the double, a feat he repeated in 2001-02. Two seasons later, Arsenal were again crowned champions without losing a single match in a remarkable run of 49 league games undefeated. Importantly, these successes were founded upon a mix of English steel and European flair, of established stars and emerging talent, of youth and experience.

Since then his acumen in both buying and selling players is proven beyond question. How many players have moved from Arsenal and improved themselves? At the same time his project of building a team of young players that have developed together has created a string of new stars coveted by leading clubs – Barcelona want Fabregas, Chelsea, Manchester City and Manchester United want Nasri, Manchester City have signed Clichy, Chelsea want Walcott, and Wilshere has emerged as a key figure in the new generation of England hopefuls.

Underpinning the above has been a pay policy that sees wages more evenly distributed across the squad than is the case with the clubs leading competitors. The logic is that this binds the players closer together, that petty jealousies are reduced, and the impact of not playing regularly in the first team is not as great – your importance, as part of the squad, is recognised and rewarded.

The difficulty however is that there is less money to reward the very best players, so they are vulnerable to the temptation of higher wages on offer at other clubs. In the same way it becomes more difficult to attract the very best players because Arsenal are unable to match the wages on offer from their major competitors and, conversely, when it comes to selling some of the fringe players the wages they’re receiving are too high relative to their ability, making it difficult to find other clubs willing to pick up the burden.

If the team were winning trophies it might be less of a problem however it’s now six years since Arsenal won anything. The promise is always ‘this next season’ as the young team matures, but a career in football is short and when the opportunity appears to earn more money at a club that is already winning things who would refuse and if they did, on what logic? Nevertheless, it is hard to argue that the policy has not been successful given that throughout the rebuilding or ‘maturing’ period Arsenal have consistently finished in the top four.

Of course the competitive landscape changed when Abramovich bought Chelsea. Not only was there an additional serious contender but here was a club with comparatively unlimited resources and ambition. Then Manchester City trumped Chelsea. With Liverpool’s new owners also investing heavily in their team, and Spurs showing genuine ambition, Arsenal find themselves under severe pressure as the competition for a top four finish and entry in to the lucrative UEFA Champions League intensifies. If Arsenal are to be competitive going forward, and retain their prudent business model, then they have to increase their revenues substantially.
    
Deloitte’s annual review of football finance showed that 42% of Arsenal’s income is generated through gate receipts – by far the highest of any major European club, and in absolute terms only Real Madrid and Manchester United earn more from this source. Ticket prices are already the most expensive in the Premier League at a time when many of the supporters seem to be having a crisis of confidence in the club’s leadership and direction: there appears little scope for further increases in ticket prices. If revenues are to grow in this area then the club needs more matches and these can only come through success in the domestic cup competitions and in the UEFA Champions League.

Achieving an increase in broadcast and associated revenues is similarly success dependent. Progress in the Champions League, achieving a high finish in the Premier League, and doing well in the FA Cup and Carling Cup, will see more matches broadcast earning additional fees and higher ‘bonus’ payments. Other than winning more games there’s little the club can do to increase revenues from this source. That said, they rank second to Manchester United in this area, and seventh in Europe – in terms of broadcast and ticketing revenues combined only Barcelona, Real Madrid and Manchester United achieve more...

This leaves commercial income: sponsorships and merchandising etc. In terms of total revenues Arsenal rank fifth in the Deloitte’s European ‘money league’, but thirteenth in respect of commercial revenues. The kit deal with Nike was extended and runs for two more seasons. The stadium naming rights agreement with Emirates continues until 2020/21 and the associated shirt sponsorship until 2013/14. With Liverpool and Manchester United both securing shirt sponsorship agreements valued at an annual Euros 24.4 million Arsenal are to some extent disadvantaged until the Emirates shirt sponsorship expires. That said there is substantial compensation in the form of non-recurring profits from property development that bridges the gap.

There is no question that increasing commercial revenues is the major area of opportunity for Arsenal. The value in the leading brands is in their global appeal with the popularity of the Premier League giving its top clubs a significant advantage over their European rivals. Traditionally Arsenal have not focused on exploiting this by sending the team to Asia, the USA and other important markets where the team enjoys substantial support. This pre-season the trips to China and Malaysia signify a recognition that they have to abandon this reticence and be far more outward looking. If the football team is under pressure to deliver results on the field the commercial team is under no less pressure to do the same off it. The problem of course is the timeframe – it will take them some years to bridge the distance between thirteenth and top four.

Conversely, Arsene Wenger has weeks in which to build a team that can compete effectively against Manchester United, Manchester City, Liverpool...and in Europe, Barcelona, Real Madrid, the two Milan’s. It appears at least, that there is a crisis of faith among some of the key members of the team – having failed so consistently last season to translate potential to trophies the other contenders appear to some to play on greener grass. Clichy has gone. Fabregas and Nasri are perhaps the litmus test – if they also go then arguably the project is over. If they stay and retain the faith, if Nasri signs a new contract and Fabregas commits his heart and soul, then with a few key additions perhaps Wenger and Arsenal can prove the doubters wrong.

The stakes could not be higher. If Arsenal falls out of the top four they will lose in the region of Euro’s 30 million in Champions League revenues alone. Their capacity to compete in the wages and transfer market will be further reduced, as will their ability to attract the players they would need to turn things around. There is a real possibility of a downward spiral. In this scenario, the distance between Arsenal and their key competitors – notwithstanding the introduction of UEFA’s Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, or the performance of the club’s commercial team – would grow and could become unbridgeable if the present policy of financial prudence remained in place. 

With his own position more vulnerable than it has ever been during his time at the club, Arsene Wenger has mounted an articulate, intelligent and passionate (in his own understated way) defence of his project, insisting that captain Fabregas and key-man Nasri would be staying and not under duress. The team will be strengthened. It was close last season, it will be stronger, better equipped this. The sooner he is able to do this the easier it should be to persuade Fabregas and Nasri that they should keep the faith and see the project through. After all winning with this team, given their development together, should be something special.

Arsene Wenger knows what it takes to win championships and cups – the question that remains is whether or not he has the necessary resources, and the will to commit them, to bring in the key additions now that will add steel to the flair, established stars to the emerging talent and greater experience to his still young side. This is a pivotal season for Arsenal and for Arsene Wenger – the outcome will constrain or enable revenue generation and dictate the ability of the club to compete over the next decade. For football more generally, it is also a key battle in the war for financial sanity.